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Abstract
We present a formal model of symmetric n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly
with a heterogeneous population of proﬁt optimizers and imitators.
Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful ﬁrms of
the previous round a l` a Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play my-
opic best response to the opponents’ previous output. The dynamics
of the decision rules induce a Markov chain. As expression of bounded
rationality, ﬁrms are allowed to make mistakes and deviate from the
decision rules with a small probability. Applying stochastic stabil-
ity analysis, we characterize the long run behavior of the oligopoly.
We ﬁnd that the long run distribution converges to a recurrent set
of states in which imitators are better oﬀ than are optimizers. This
ﬁnding appears to be robust even when optimizers are more sophisti-
cated. It suggests that imitators drive optimizers out of the market
contradicting a fundamental conjecture by Friedman (1953).
JEL-Classiﬁcations: C72, D21, D43, L13.
Keywords: imitation, myopic best reply, bounded rationality, proﬁt
maximization hypothesis, stochastic stability, learning, Stackelberg.1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental assumptions in economics is that ﬁrms maxi-
mize absolute proﬁts. However, already Alchian (1950) suggested that ﬁrms
may maximize relative proﬁts in the long run rather than absolute proﬁts. In
contrast, Friedman (1953) argued that evolutionary selection forces favor ab-
solute proﬁt maximization. In particular, he postulated that, although ﬁrms
may not know their proﬁt functions, we can assume that they behave as if
they maximize proﬁts because otherwise they would be driven out of the mar-
ket by ﬁrms that do behave as if they maximize proﬁts. Koopmans (1957),
p. 140, remarked that if selection does lead to proﬁt maximization then
such an evolutionary process should be part of economic modeling. Taking
Koopmans’ suggestion into consideration, this paper describes an attempt
to prove Friedman’s conjecture. This attempt failed. That is, in the model
presented here it turns out that Friedman’s conjecture is false.
The present paper was partly inspired by Vega-Redondo (1997).1 He
showes that, in a quantity setting n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot oligopoly with
a homogeneous population of imitators, the long run outcome converges to
the competitive output if small mistakes are allowed. Imitators mimic the
output of the most successful ﬁrms in the previous round. His result is in
sharp contrast to a homogeneous population of optimizers, which is known to
converge under certain conditions in the Cournot tatonnement to the Cournot
Nash equilibrium. It seems natural to wonder what happens if imitators and
optimizers are mixed together in a heterogeneous population. According to
Friedman, we should ﬁnd that optimizers are better oﬀ than are imitators,
and that consequently optimizers drive out imitators in any payoﬀ monotone
1See also related work by Schaﬀer (1989), Rhode and Stegeman (2001) and Al´ os-Ferrer,
Ania, and Vega-Redondo (1999).
1selection dynamics. However, we ﬁnd that imitators are strictly better oﬀ
than are optimizers, which is at ﬁrst glance a rather surprising result given
that imitators are less sophisticated than optimizers. In a sense, this result
is reminiscent of Stackelberg behavior. That’s why we name the support of
the long run distribution the set of Pseudo-Stackelberg states. First, im-
itators and optimizers play roles analogous to those of the “independent”
and the “dependent” ﬁrms respectively in von Stackelberg’s (1934) work.
It is interesting to note that von Stackelberg himself never used the word
“leader” in his book but spoke of the “independent” and the “dependent”
ﬁrm. Moreover, today’s familiar sequential representation of the Stackelberg
game is not due to von Stackelberg but was introduced in a diﬀerent con-
text as the “majorant game” by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), pp.
100.2 Optimizers are “dependent” since by deﬁnition they play best reply.
Although the imitators are “independent” because they do not perceive their
inﬂuence on the price but take them as given, they do not conform exactly
to the Stackelberg conjecture. Second, analogous to the proﬁts in von Stack-
elberg’s (1934) independent and dependent ﬁrms, every imitator is better oﬀ
than every optimizers. Finally, our analysis retains the important aspect of
von Stackelberg’s (1934) idea: the modeling of asymmetries and behavioral
heterogeneity of ﬁrms and in particular the modeling of independent and
dependent ﬁrms.
Imitators and optimizers diﬀer in respect to the knowledge required to
take their decisions. Whereas for imitators it is suﬃcient to know the previous
period’s outputs of every ﬁrm and their associated proﬁts3, optimizers need to
know the total output of their opponents as well as their own proﬁt function,
2I thank Prof. Selten for pointing me to the “majorant game”.
3See Al´ os-Ferrer (2001) for a study of imitators in Cournot oligopoly who take a longer
history into account.
2which implies knowing inverse demand and costs, in order to calculate the
myopic best response. Imitation is often associated with boundedly rational
behavior but note that imitation of successful behavior can be also a rational
rule of thumb (Vega-Redondo, 1997) when ﬁrms and decision makers have
diﬃculties in perceiving their proﬁt functions. They can easily judge their
performance relative to other ﬁrms in the industry. This might be a reason
why one part of executives’ remuneration-packages is often based on the
ﬁrm’s stock outperforming the market index or similar means of comparison.
Earlier experimental studies on Cournot oligopoly like the one by Sauer-
mann and Selten (1959) found some support for the convergence to Cournot
Nash equilibrium. Recent studies by Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (1999,
2000) found support for imitative behavior in experimental Cournot settings.
Whereas in former experiments subjects had proﬁt tables for easy calculation
of the best reply available, in later studies subjects received feedback about
the competitors’ proﬁts and output levels. The informational framework of
these experimental designs corresponds closely to the information required
by each of the two decision rules (see also Oﬀerman, Potters, and Sonnemans,
2002, for further experimental evidence).
In the proofs of our results, we rely on two main concepts, submodular-
ity of payoﬀ functions and stochastic stability analysis. Submodularity (see
Topkis, 1998, pp. 43) is closely related to strategic substitutes (see Bulow,
Geanakoplos and Klemperer, 1985).4 The intuition for submodularity in our
context is that a ﬁrm’s payoﬀ diﬀerence from an increase of its own output
decreases in the total output.
4For submodularity and supermodularity in the context of a Cournot oligopoly see Vives
(1990), Amir (1996) and Vives (2000), chapter 4. Formally, supermodularity is related to
the single-crossing property and submodularity to the dual single-crossing property (see
Topkis, 1998, Milgrom and Shannon, 1994).
3Following Kandori, Rob and Mailath (1993) and Young (1993), the dy-
namic analysis in this paper uses the concept of stochastic stability developed
by Freidlin and Wentzel (1984), as well as its characterization result (see also
Ellison, 2000, and others). The general idea is that mutations select among
absorbing sets of the decision process such that only the most robust absorb-
ing sets remain in the support of the limiting invariant distribution. There are
several alternative interpretations of the noise in our context. First, ﬁrms are
assumed to innovate in a sense of experimenting with various output levels.
Second, decision makers of the ﬁrms are assumed to be boundedly rational
in the sense that there is always a small positive probability of making mis-
takes in output decisions. Finally, every period, a small fraction of the ﬁrms
is replaced by newcomers who choose their output from tabula rasa. Any of
those interpretations adds some realistic feature to the model. Instead mak-
ing use of the graph theoretic arguments developed by Freidlin and Wentzel
(1984) as well as Kandori, Rob and Mailath (1993) and Young (1993), we
employ a simpler necessary condition for stochastic stability introduced by
N¨ oldeke and Samuelson (1993), Samuelson (1994) and N¨ oldeke and Samuel-
son (1997). They show that a necessary condition for a state to be contained
in the support of the unique invariant limiting distribution is that this state
be contained in the minimal set of absorbing sets that is robust to a single
mutation. Such a set is called recurrent set. In Theorem 1 we show that
the symmetric Cournot Nash equilibrium, the only absorbing state in which
optimizers are as well oﬀ as imitators, is not the unique stochastically stable
state. Moreover, in Theorem 2 we show that there are assumptions on the
parameters of the game such that the entire set of Pseudo-Stackelberg states
is the unique recurrent set and thus is the support of the unique limiting
invariant distribution.
4Apart from pure theoretical interest, the analysis presented here is of
practical relevance since imitation, in the form of “benchmarking” and “best
practices”, is widely used in today’s management. Given that such imitative
behavior exists among other decision rules in today’s business practice, it is
only natural for theorists to investigate imitation as well as the heterogeneity
of decision rules.
Conlisk (1980) also analyzes a dynamic model with imitators and opti-
mizers. His approach diﬀers from the current one in that he takes the cost
of optimizing into account, and this cost is a key for obtaining his results.
Research on Friedman’s proﬁt maximization hypothesis has been done for
example by Blume and Easley (2002), who ﬁnd support for it in a general
equilibrium context. The present paper is also related to the literature on
interdependent preferences. In particular, Ko¸ ckesen, Ok and Sethi (2000)
found that players who also care about relative payoﬀs may have a strategic
advantage in a class of symmetric games including the Cournot game. Note
that imitators do care about relative payoﬀs since their decision rule involves
a comparison of proﬁts among ﬁrms. Similarly, biased perceptions as studied
by Heifetz and Spiegel (2002), can yield a strategic advantage in our setting
if they induce players to play more aggressively compared to unbiased proﬁt
maximizers.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and
the decision rules. It is followed in section 3 by an informal discussion of
candidates for solutions. Section 4 works out the results, which are subse-
quently discussed in the concluding section 5. All proofs are contained in the
appendix. The required mathematical tools are introduced along the way.
52 Basic Model and Decision Rules
This section outlines the basic model in the spirit of Cournot (1838), pp.
79. Consider a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms N = {1,2,...,n} and a market for
a homogeneous good. Inverse demand is given by a function p : R+ −→
R+. For every total output quantity Q ∈ R+ this function speciﬁes the
market clearing price p(Q). By the assumption of symmetry, every ﬁrm
i ∈ N possesses the same production technology. Hence the cost functions
c : R+ −→ R+ are identical. For each ﬁrm it is a function of the quantity qi
it produces. Let the total output over all ﬁrms be Q :=
P
i∈N qi. Proﬁts are
given by
πi(qi,Q) := qip(Q) − c(qi),∀i ∈ N. (1)
We restrict our analysis to a symmetric oligopoly since imitation is more
reasonable if ﬁrms face similar conditions of production.
For technical reasons we assume that ﬁrms choose output from a common
ﬁnite grid Γ = {0,δ,2δ,...,νδ}, where both δ > 0 and ν ∈ N are arbitrary.
This turns the strategic situation into a game with ﬁnite action space and
allows us to focus on ﬁnite Markov chains later in the dynamic analysis.
We wish to show that each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ function is submodular in the
ﬁrm’s quantity and the total output. This observation will play a key role
in the proofs of our results. It is closely related to strategic substitutes (see
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer, 1985). To this end, a few deﬁnitions
are needed.
A lattice is deﬁned as a poset5 hX,≤i whose least upper bound and great-
5A partially ordered set (poset) hX,≤i is deﬁned as a set X with a binary relation ≤
such that ∀x,y,z ∈ X the following conditions hold:
(i) reﬂexivity: ∀x ∈ X, x ≤ x,
6est lower bound are given by x0 ∨ x00 = sup{x0,x00} and x0 ∧ x00 = inf{x0,x00},
for all x0,x00 ∈ X respectively. For example, if X is the product of several
ordered sets, one may deﬁne x0 ∨ x00 (likewise x0 ∧ x00) as the component-
wise max (min) to deﬁne a lattice. In our context Γ = {0,δ,2δ,...,νδ} and
products thereof endowed with component-wise max and min operations are
lattices. A real valued function f : X −→ R on a lattice X is called sub-
modular on X if ∀x0,x00 ∈ X, f(x0 ∧ x00) + f(x0 ∨ x00) ≤ f(x0) + f(x00). The
function f is called strictly submodular if the inequality holds strictly for all
unordered x0,x00 ∈ X.6
Assumption 1 (Strictly Decreasing Demand) ∀Q,Q0 ∈ {0,δ,2δ,...,nνδ},
Q0 > Q =⇒ p(Q0) < p(Q).
Lemma 1 By Assumption 1, πi is strictly submodular in (qi,Q) on Γ ×
{0,δ,2δ,...,nνδ}, ∀i ∈ N, i.e. ∀(q0
i,Q0),(q00




















If Assumption 1 is modiﬁed such that p is weakly decreasing then πi is
submodular but not strictly submodular in (qi,Q) on Γ × {0,δ,2δ,...,nνδ}.
Remark 1 (Strict) submodularity implies (strict) quasi-submodularity of π



























(ii) antisymmetry: if x ≤ y and y ≤ x =⇒ x = y,
(iii) transitivity: if x ≤ y and y ≤ z =⇒ x ≤ z.
6A pair x0,x00 ∈ X is unordered iﬀ none of the two statements holds: x0 ≤ x00, x00 ≤ x0.
7For notational ease we drop subscripts and superscripts when no ambiguity is likely
to arise.
7The observation that payoﬀs are quasi-submodular8 in individual quantity
and total output will be used in later proofs repeatedly, in particular in
Lemma 4 and Remark 2. Note that this property follows directly from the
structure of the Cournot game. No additional assumptions on the game have
to be imposed.
The dynamics of the system is assumed to proceed in discrete time, in-
dexed by t = 0,1,2,.... At each t the state of the system is identiﬁed by the
current output schedule
ω(t) = (q1(t),q2(t),...,qn(t)).
Thus, the state space of the system is identical to Γn. Associated with any
such state ω(t) ∈ Γn is the induced proﬁt proﬁle π(t) = (π1(t),π2(t),...,πn(t))
at t, deﬁned as follows:
πi(t) := qi(t)p(Q(t)) − c(qi(t)),∀i ∈ N. (5)
Assumption 2 (Inertia) At every time t = 1,2,..., each ﬁrm i ∈ N has
regardless of history an i.i.d. probability ρ ∈ (0,1) of being able to revise her
former output qi(t − 1).
Note that since ρ < 1 the process has inertia. That is, not every period all
ﬁrms adjust output. The idea is that it is too costly to always adjust output.
The ﬁnite population of ﬁrms N is partitioned into two subpopulations
of imitators and optimizers respectively. Let I be the subset of N that con-
tains all imitators. The fraction of imitators in the population is denoted
by θ =
]I
]N. Throughout the paper we assume that θ ∈ (0,1), i.e. we have
8For quasisubmodularity see also Milgrom and Shannon (1994), p. 162 and Topkis
(1998), pp. 58. It is the ordinal notion of submodularity.
8a heterogeneous population of ﬁrms with at least one imitator and one op-
timizer. The ﬁrms in the two subpopulations are characterized by diﬀerent
decision rules. The idea of a decision rule is appropriately summarized by
Nelson and Winter (1982) who write that “...at any time, ﬁrms in an indus-
try can be viewed as operating with a set of techniques and decision rules
(routines), keyed to conditions external to the ﬁrm ... and to various inter-
nal state conditions...” (p. 165). Conventional economics focuses mainly on
proﬁt maximization. However, “benchmarking”, “best practices” and other
imitation rules can be found in today’s management practice.
Deﬁnition 1 (Imitator) An imitator i ∈ I chooses with full support from
the set
DI(t − 1) := {q ∈ Γ : ∃j ∈ N s.t. q = qj(t − 1) and
∀k ∈ N,πj(t − 1) ≥ πk(t − 1)}. (6)
Deﬁnition 2 (Optimizer) An optimizer i ∈ N\I chooses from the set
DO(t − 1) := {q ∈ Γ : q ∈ bi(q−i(t − 1))}, (7)
with q−i :=
P











≥ qip(q−i + qi) − c(qi),∀qi ∈ Γ}. (8)
It is assumed that initially in t = 0 both types of ﬁrms start with an
arbitrary output within the admissible domain Γ.
The imitation rule is explained as follows: Every period there exists a ﬁrm
j that had the highest proﬁt in the previous period. An imitator imitates
9the previous period’s quantity of ﬁrm j. It is the same imitation rule as
used in Vega-Redondo (1997). Deﬁnition 2 means that an optimizer sets
an output level that is a best reply to the opponents’ total output in the
previous period.
The process induced by the decision rules is a discrete time n-vector
ﬁnite Markov chain with stationary transition probabilities. Finiteness is
provided by the ﬁnite state space Γn. It is a vector process since each ω is a
vector in Γn. Due to the myopic decision rules, the process has the Markov
property, namely prob{ω(t + 1)|ω(t),ω(t − 1),...,ω(t − k)} = prob{ω(t +
1)|ω(t)}. That is, ω(t) contains all the information needed to determine
transition probabilities. Since the decision rules themselves do not change
over time, the process has stationary transition probabilities prob{ω0(t +
1)|ω(t)} = prob{ω0(t + k + 1)|ω(t + k)}, k = 0,1,...
The Markov operator is deﬁned in the standard way as the ]Γn × ]Γn-
transition probability matrix P = (pωω0)ω,ω0∈Γn with pωω0 = prob{ω0|ω},
pωω0 ≥ 0, ω,ω0 ∈ Γn and
P
ω0∈Γn pωω0 = 1, ∀ω ∈ Γn. That is, the element
pωω0 in the transition probability matrix P is the conditional probability that
the state is in ω0 at t + 1 given that it is in ω at t. According to this deﬁni-
tion of a Markov transition matrix, probability distributions over states are
represented by row vectors.
To complete the model of the decision process we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 3 (Noise) At every output revision opportunity t, each ﬁrm
follows her decision rule with probability (1 − ε), ε ∈ (0,a], a being small,
and with probability ε she randomizes with full support Γ.
As a matter of convention, we call a ﬁrm mutating in t if it randomizes
with full support in t. The noise has a convenient technical property. Let
10P(ε) be the Markov chain P perturbed with the level of noise ε. Then by
Assumption 3, P(ε) is regularly perturbed (Young, 1993, p. 70), i.e. it is an
ergodic and irreducible Markov chain on Γn. This implies that there exists
a unique invariant distribution ϕ(ε) on Γn (for standard results on Markov
processes see for example Masaaki, 1997). To put it more intuitively, the
noise makes any state accessible from any other state in ﬁnite time. This is
suﬃcient for the existence of the unique invariant distribution.
The following analysis focuses on the unique limiting invariant distribu-
tion ϕ∗ of P deﬁned by ϕ(ε)P(ε) = ϕ(ε), ϕ∗ := limε→0 ϕ(ε) and ϕ∗P = ϕ∗.
In particular, the focus is on how to characterize this probability vector since
it provides a description of the long run output behavior of the market when
the noise goes to zero. For that reason we will refer to it also as the long
run distribution. It determines the average proportion of time spent in each
state of the state space in the long run, or expressed diﬀerently, the relative
frequency of a state’s appearance as the time goes to inﬁnity (see Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998, or Samuelson, 1997, for an introduction and discussion of
this method).
3 Candidates for Solutions
In this section we informally discuss candidates for solutions. By standard
results (e.g. see Samuelson, 1997, Proposition 7.4) we know that the support
of the long run distribution can only contain states that are elements of
absorbing sets of the unperturbed process. Therefore we consider ﬁrst the
case of no noise, ε = 0, and deﬁne an absorbing set A ⊆ Γn in the standard
way by
(i) ∀ω ∈ A, ∀ω0 / ∈ A, pωω0 = 0 and
11(ii) ∀ω,ω0 ∈ A, ∃m ∈ N, m ﬁnite, s.t. p
(m)
ωω0 > 0, p
(m)
ωω0 being the m-step
transition probability from ω to ω0.
Let Z be the collection of all absorbing sets in Γn.
Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that a homogeneous population of imitators
in our framework converges to the competitive solution. Can the competitive
solution be an absorbing state given a heterogeneous population of imitators
and optimizers? Suppose the unique competitive solution exists in the grid.
Consider ﬁrst the imitators. Every ﬁrm plays its share of the competitive so-
lution. By symmetry all ﬁrms make identical proﬁts. Thus nobody is better
oﬀ and imitators have no reason to deviate from their output. However, since
n is ﬁnite, optimizers do not generally play a best reply. Each optimizer’s
share of the competitive output is larger than the best response. Hence they
will deviate to the best response leading to a state diﬀerent from the com-
petitive solution. It follows that the competitive solution is not an absorbing
state.
Consider now a state where every ﬁrm sets its symmetric Cournot Nash
equilibrium output assuming that it exists in the grid Γ and that it is unique.













i + qi) − c(qi),∀qi ∈ Γ. (9)
It is known that in a homogeneous population of optimizers the Cournot
Nash equilibrium is the solution of a sequential best response process under
certain assumptions guaranteeing global convergence. In a heterogeneous
population, imitators do not deviate since all ﬁrms set identical outputs and
earn identical proﬁts. Optimizers do not deviate too since they anyway set
best response quantities. Thus it appears that the symmetric Cournot Nash
12equilibrium is an absorbing state. However, is it the unique absorbing state?
Consider the following state:9
Deﬁnition 4 (Pseudo-Stackelberg Solution) The Pseudo-Stackelberg so-
lution is a state ωS = (q1,...,qθn,qθn+1,...,qn) that satisﬁes the following con-
ditions:
(i) ∀i ∈ I, qi = qS s.t.
q
Sp(θnq




S + (1 − θ)nq
D) − c(q),∀q ∈ Γ, (10)
(ii) ∀i ∈ N\I qi = qD,
q
D := b(θnq
S + ((1 − θ)n − 1)q
D). (11)
In the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution all imitators set the identical output.
This output maximizes proﬁts of imitators given that they do not perceive
any inﬂuence on the price and the optimizers set the identical best reply.
We call this outcome the Pseudo-Stackelberg Solution because of its obvi-
ous similarities and diﬀerences to the notion of Stackelberg solution in the
literature.
Analogous to the proﬁts of von Stackelberg’s (1934) independent and
dependent ﬁrms, every imitator is strictly better oﬀ than every optimizer





D,n,θ),∀i ∈ I,j ∈ N\I.
9We assume that the best reply is unique. The uniqueness condition later in Assump-
tion 5 ensures that the best reply to the opponents’ output is indeed a singleton.
10For notational convenience we write πi(q,q0,n,θ) for πi(q,θnq +(1−θ)nq0) if i ∈ I or
for πi(q0,θnq + (1 − θ)nq0) if i ∈ N\I.
13Why is the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution a candidate for a solution? As-
sume that the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution exists in Γn and that is unique.
Consider ﬁrst the imitators: every imitator sets identical output and is
strictly better oﬀ than any optimizer. Hence an imitator has no reason to
deviate from its output. Also optimizers do not deviate from their output
since they play the best response.
In the following, we will reserve qS to denote the identical individual out-
put of any imitator in the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution. qI denotes that the
individual quantity q is set by each imitator (superscript “I” stands for “inde-
pendent” or all “imitators”). Analog, qD means that the individual quantity
q is set by each optimizer (superscript “D” stands for “dependent”). The
analogous notation applies to the proﬁt functions πI and πD. Generally, a
superscript indicates identical individual values for all ﬁrms within a sub-
population whereas a subscript indicates individual not necessarily identical
values.
Previous arguments suggest already that the Cournot Nash equilibrium
and the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution may not be the only candidates for
solutions. To facilitate the analysis we deﬁne the following set of states:11
Deﬁnition 5 (Pseudo-Stackelberg States) The set of Pseudo-Stackelberg
states H consists of all states ω = (q1,...,qθn,qθn+1,...,qn) ∈ Γn that satisfy
the following properties:
(i) qi = qI, ∀i ∈ I and some qI ∈ Γ,
(ii) qi = qD, ∀i ∈ N\I, qD := b(θnqI + ((1 − θ)n − 1)qD),
(iii) πI(qI,qD,n,θ) ≥ πD(qI,qD,n,θ),
11Again, we assume that the best reply is unique. The uniqueness condition later in
Assumption 5 ensures that the best reply to the opponents’ output is indeed a singleton.
14(iv) πI(qI,qD,n,θ) = πD(qI,qD,n,θ) iﬀ qI = qD.
Assume that each Pseudo-Stackelberg state is uniquely deﬁned by the
above conditions. If condition (i) is not satisﬁed, an imitator may mimic a
diﬀerent output decision from another imitator if the latter happens to have
higher proﬁts. If condition (ii) is not satisﬁed, not all optimizers are playing
the best reply having an incentive to deviate. If condition (iii) is not satisﬁed,
imitators will mimic optimizers. To understand the motivation of (iv) note
that by identical costs, qI = qD implies πI(qD,qI,n,θ) = πD(qD,qI,n,θ).
To see the purpose of the other direction note that if πI(qD,qI,n,θ) =
πD(qD,qI,n,θ) and qI 6= qD then imitators would be indiﬀerent between
qI and qD thus adding a source of instability.
In each Pseudo-Stackelberg state, imitators are weakly better oﬀ than
optimizers. In fact, imitators are strictly better oﬀ in any Pseudo-Stackelberg
state except the Cournot Nash equilibrium, the only state where optimizers
are as well oﬀ as imitators.
It is clear that the set of Pseudo-Stackelberg states is nonempty since the
Cournot Nash equilibrium - assume that it exists - belongs to it. Moreover,
it is easy to see that the competitive solution is not a Pseudo-Stackelberg
state since optimizers do not set a best reply in the competitive solution
(unless n → ∞). Finally, if the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution exists and c is
strictly convex then the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution is a Pseudo-Stackelberg
state since qS > qD are such that πI(qS,qD,θ,n) > πD(qS,qD,θ,n). Thus
properties (i) to (iv) of Deﬁnition 5 of Pseudo-Stackelberg states are satisﬁed.
If c is not strictly convex condition (iv) might be violated. To see this,
assume that costs are linear (weakly convex). Imitators make zero proﬁts
when price equals marginal costs. The optimizers’ best response is zero
output. Then imitators are indiﬀerent between zero output and qS. If costs
15are strictly convex then imitators make strict positive proﬁts and optimizers
set a positive output level which is lower than qS. Thus each optimizer makes
less proﬁt than any imitator.
4 The Result
Before we state and prove the results in this section, we need to introduce
formally the assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption concerns the existence of
outcomes.
Assumption 4 (Existence) The Cournot Nash equilibrium and at least
another Pseudo-Stackelberg state exists in Γn.
We like to focus on the dynamics in an oligopoly with a heterogeneous
population of ﬁrms. We do not concern ourselves with questions of existence,
which have been dealt with elsewhere. We avoid to state the above assump-
tion in terms of primitives of the model since the existence of Cournot Nash
equilibrium in a symmetric n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly can be shown under
very general alternative assumptions even without concave proﬁt functions
(see for example Roberts and Sonnenschein, 1976, Amir, 1996, and Vives,
2000). In a non-degenerate Cournot oligopoly, whenever the Cournot Nash
equilibrium exists, some other Pseudo-Stackelberg states also exist. The
existence of another Pseudo-Stackelberg state makes the Cournot oligopoly
interesting. The fact that those outputs are an element of Γ is not really an
assumption since the grid Γ is arbitrary.
Assumption 5 (Uniqueness) For q0
−i < q−i, q0 ∈ b(q0






16This second assumption is rather standard and is made in order to obtain
a unique best reply. Vives (2000), Theorem 2.8 shows in a simple proof that
if a Cournot Nash equilibrium exists and the above assumption holds, then
it must be unique. Note that the condition is equivalent to q0
−i+q0 < q−i+q.
The requirement is that the best reply correspondence must have slopes
strictly above −1. It means that total output is strictly increasing in the op-
ponents’ output. The uniqueness condition implies that the unique Cournot
Nash equilibrium is symmetric and that the best reply correspondence is in
fact a function (see Vives, 2000, p. 43).
Assumption 6 (Generalized Ordinal Potential) The Cournot game has
a generalized ordinal potential.12
A potential function monitors the drift towards the Nash equilibrium. In
the context of a general Cournot oligopoly, a potential function is generally
diﬃcult to interpret. It raises the question what do the ﬁrms consciously
or unconsciously try to jointly optimize? Important is that such a poten-
tial function implies the existence of a ﬁnite improvement path towards the
unique Nash equilibrium (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Lemma 2.5). Slade
(1994) proves the existence of an exact potential, a much stronger version
than the generalized ordinal potential function, for the case of a Cournot
oligopoly with linear demand. An example for the existence of an ordinal
potential is given for a Cournot oligopoly with linear costs by Monderer and
12A generalized ordinal potential (see Monderer and Shapley, 1996) is a function
P : Γn −→ R for the Cournot game such that for every i ∈ N and for every
q−i ∈ {0,δ,2δ,...,(n − 1)νδ} and every q,q0 ∈ Γ it holds that
πi(q,q−i) − πi(q0,q−i) > 0 =⇒ P(q,q−i) − P(q0,q−i) > 0.
17Shapley (1996), p. 124. We do not know of a full characterization of sym-
metric n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly satisfying the weaker requirement of the
existence of a generalized ordinal potential. We conjecture that such charac-
terization would be more general than the ones satisfying exact, weighted, or
ordinal potentials. At this point of time, investigation of this conjecture is left
to further research. The existence of a ﬁnite improvement path implies that
the sequential best response dynamics converges to the Nash equilibrium.
Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (1999) make use of this result to show that
the best reply process with inertia converges to the Cournot Nash equilib-
rium in a quantity setting symmetric linear quadropoly. Note that there are
of course alternative assumptions that would guarantee convergence to the
Cournot Nash equilibrium, for instance dominance solvability (see Moulin,
1984).
Assumption 7 (Quasiconcavity) πi is quasiconcave in qi, ∀i ∈ I. That
is ∀qi,q0
i ∈ Γ, ∀λ ∈ [0,1]




i,Q)},∀Q ∈ {0,δ,2δ,...,nνδ}. (13)
The intuition for quasiconcavity is single-peakedness. The set of maxima
is convex. If the inequality holds strictly for λ ∈ (0,1), then π is strictly
quasiconcave and the maximum is unique. Concavity and weak concavity
imply quasiconcavity but not vice versa.
We are ﬁnally ready to state the main result.
Theorem 1 Let S denote the support of the long run distribution ϕ∗. Under
the above assumptions, we have S ⊆ H. Moreover, it is never true that
S = {ω◦}.
The result is that given our assumptions the support S of the long run
distribution ϕ∗ is contained in the set of Pseudo-Stackelberg states H ⊂ Γn.
18Moreover, the Cournot state ω◦, the only state in which optimizers are as
well oﬀ as imitators, is never the unique long run outcome. It follows that
imitators are strictly better oﬀ than are optimizers in the long run.
The proof in the appendix is divided into three lemmata. First, in
Lemma 2 we work out the absorbing sets of the unperturbed process. As we
suggested in the previous section, the set of absorbing sets comprises exactly
of the set of Pseudo-Stackelberg states, whereby each Pseudo-Stackelberg
state is an absorbing state. Since by standard arguments the support of the
long run distribution is a subset of the set of absorbing sets, we can con-
clude immediately that the support is the subset of the Pseudo-Stackelberg
states. It implies that the imitators are weakly better oﬀ than are opti-
mizers. Second, making use of the Lemma 3 by N¨ oldeke and Samuelson
(1993), Samuelson (1994) and N¨ oldeke and Samuelson (1997), we show with
Lemma 4 that the Cournot Nash equilibrium is not uniquely stochastically
stable. That is, the Cournot Nash equilibrium is not robust against a single
mutation. Since the Cournot Nash equilibrium is the only state in which
optimizers are as well oﬀ as imitators, we can ﬁnally conclude that imitators
are strictly better oﬀ than are optimizers in the long run.
In the proof of Theorem 1, particularly in Lemma 4, we show even more.
We can order the Pseudo-Stackelberg states according to the identical out-
put of imitators. We then show that, making use of quasi-submodularity
and quasi-concavity, we can ﬁnd a sequence of single mutations followed
by the unperturbed decision dynamics by which one can move through the
Pseudo-Stackelberg states step-wise upwards starting at the Cournot Nash
equilibrium. If the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution does not exist within the set
of Pseudo-Stackelberg states, this step-wise mutation-sequence terminates
at the Pseudo-Stackelberg state with the highest output of imitators. If
19the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution does exist in the set of Pseudo-Stackelberg
states, then the sequence ends there. In this case one can also ﬁnd a sequence
of single mutations by which one can move step-wise downwards starting from
the Pseudo-Stackelberg state with the highest output of imitators and end-
ing at the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution. In fact, if the Pseudo-Stackelberg
solution exists within the set of Pseudo-Stackelberg states, we show the fol-
lowing.
Remark 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 to 6 hold. If ωS ∈ H, then any state
in H can be connected to the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution by a single suitable
mutation followed by the unperturbed decision dynamics.
We can connect any Pseudo-Stackelberg state to the Pseudo-Stackelberg so-
lution by a single suitable mutation even without the assumption of quasi-
concavity. It suggests that the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution - if it exists in
H - is a candidate for a unique long run solution. It also establishes with-
out the assumption of quasi-concavity that the Cournot Nash equilibrium
is not uniquely stochastically stable. However, it is premature to conjec-
ture that the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution is the unique long run outcome.
In particular, we can destabilize any Pseudo-Stackelberg state including the
Pseudo-Stackelberg solution by a single suitable mutation with a suﬃcient
large output. In Theorem 2 we show that it is even possible to ﬁnd plausible
assumptions on the parameters of the model that are suﬃcient for the entire
set of the Pseudo-Stackelberg states being in the support of the long run
distribution.
Theorem 2 Suppose that above assumptions hold. Then there exist p, c, θ,
δ and ﬁnite n such that S = H.
20Indeed, one can ﬁnd reasonable functions p, c and parameters θ, δ as
well as a ﬁnite n that are suﬃcient for the entire set of Pseudo-Stackelberg
states to be the support of the unique limiting invariant distribution. For
example, consider p(Q) = 10 − Q, c(qi) = q2
i, θ = 0.6, δ = 0.2 and n =
5. Those assumptions are suﬃcient to show that any Pseudo-Stackelberg
state can be connected to the Cournot Nash equilibrium as well as to the
Pseudo-Stackelberg state with the largest output of imitators by a sequence
of single suitable mutations followed by the unperturbed decision dynamics.
This is done in Lemmata 6 and 7 respectively, making use of Lemma 5.
Together with Lemma 4, in which we showed the existence of increasing and
decreasing sequences of single mutations in the set of Pseudo-Stackelberg
states, it implies that the entire set of Pseudo-Stackelberg states is the unique
recurrent set. Using Lemma 3 by N¨ oldeke and Samuelson (1993), Samuelson
(1994) and N¨ oldeke and Samuelson (1997) we can conclude that the entire
set of Pseudo-Stackelberg states is the support of the long run distribution.
Again, it follows that imitators are strictly better oﬀ than are optimizers.
5 Discussion
The signiﬁcance of the previous results stems from the following conclusion: If
imitators are strictly better oﬀ than are optimizers, then any payoﬀ monotone
selection dynamics (see for example Weibull, 1995) on the long run proﬁts
selects imitators in favor of optimizers. That is, an evolutionary dynamics
reﬂecting the paradigm of “survival of the ﬁttest” will show that imitators
drive optimizers out of the market. Thus Friedman’s (1953) conjecture is
false in the oldest formal model of market competition in economics, the
Cournot oligopoly (Cournot, 1838). In a working paper-version (Schipper,
212002) we make this argument precise by showing how imitators drive out
optimizers in the example of the discrete time ﬁnite population replicator
dynamics on the long run proﬁts. The intuition there is that ﬁrms enter each
market day with a ﬁxed decision rule and the market day takes as long as
the long run outcome of outputs to emerge. Before markets are reopened
the next day, the “evolutionary hand” chooses for each ﬁrm the decision
rule selecting eﬀectively among ﬁrms. Alternatively, one can assume that at
the end of each day, the management of every ﬁrm holds independently a
strategy meeting to decide on its decision rule for the next day according to
the relative performance of their current decision rule. The market sessions
are repeated day for day. One can show that a homogeneous population
of imitators is the unique asymptotically stable population state. From this
evolutionary prospectus we can not assume in economics that ﬁrms behave as
if the maximize absolute proﬁts.13 After all Vega-Redondo’s (1997) imitators
are supported by those evolutionary arguments. The same holds for Alchian’s
(1950) suggestion since imitators want to be as well oﬀ as others, which is
closely related to relative proﬁt maximization.
There are a few critiques we like to address. First, one may criticize
the limitations of the optimizers. Playing myopic best response is not really
sophisticated optimization. Consider what happens if we make the optimizers
more and more sophisticated. Suppose ﬁrst we would allow optimizers to
take a longer history of output decisions into account when deciding which
output level to set. Then results are not likely to change but convergence may
13Alternatively, one may want to extent the Markov chain to a product set of the output
space and the decision rule space. If we assume that the probability of revising decision
rules is suﬃciently lower than the probability of adjusting outputs, then the same result
is likely to emerge.
22be slower since the adjustment process becomes similar to ﬁctitious play.14
Second, suppose that optimizers can forecast the behavior of the imitators.
What does it help them if imitators set some large output, which they will do
in ﬁnite time by the noise assumed? All the optimizers can do is playing best
reply against their beliefs leading them to play a smaller output with smaller
proﬁts than imitators. Finally, assume that optimizers are so sophisticated
that they can even forecast their eﬀect of their own action on the imitators’
behavior. For imitators to make lower proﬁts than optimizers, the latter have
to induce the former to lower quantities. Lower quantities in turn are played
by imitators if the most successful ﬁrm of some previous round did play such
low quantity. In Cournot games a lower quantity is more proﬁtable than a
larger one if the total market output is huge, e.g. some ﬁrms must play huge
quantities making even higher losses than imitators in order to reduce the
imitators quantities. This strategy is very costly to optimizers such that it
is unlikely to make optimizers relatively better oﬀ than imitators. Moreover,
any proﬁtable “low-balling” of imitators by optimizers can happen by inertia
just temporarily since imitators would seek to mimic optimizers immediately.
It appears that no matter how sophisticated the optimization behavior of
optimizers is, by the order structure of the Cournot game, optimizers can
not beat imitators.
In this context it is natural to ask, why optimizers do not just mimic
imitators? Suppose they do. Then all ﬁrms behave as if they are imitators
and Vega-Redondo’s (1997) result of a competitive solution would emerge.
However, in the competitive solution every optimizer has an incentive to de-
viate to its lower best reply output since it would increase its proﬁt although
it increases the proﬁts of imitators even more. The imitation rule is a com-
14Regarding ﬁctitious play refer for example to Fudenberg and Levine (1998), pp. 29.
23mitment technology, which the optimizer does not like to adopt, not because
it involves some investment cost but because the optimizer is worse oﬀ in
absolute terms when adopting the technology although it can improve its
relative standing.
A second critique could aim at the semantics of proﬁt optimization. Ob-
viously in my setting the optimizers are absolute proﬁt maximizers in regard
to their objective but not in terms of the result. This highlights the ambigu-
ity of proﬁt maximization in Cournot oligopoly. Aiming to maximize proﬁt
may not be the way to actually obtain the maximal proﬁt. We show that
the standard text book understanding of proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms can not be
supported by evolutionary arguments in Cournot oligopoly. Our awareness
of the ambiguity of “proﬁt maximization” in a class of games is an insight
gained from this analysis rather than a ﬂaw of this approach.
A third possible critique point is of a more technical nature. We use the
concept of stochastic stability developed by Freidlin and Wentzel (1984) as
well as Kandori, Rob and Mailath (1993) and Young (1993). In many applica-
tions of this concept in literature (for a partial review of the increasing litera-
ture using this method see for example Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, chapter
5), the characterization of the long run distribution involves a comparison of
a multiplicity of highly unlikely mutations. A meaningful application of this
method must address the question about the speed of convergence. How long
does it take for the long run outcome to emerge? The advantage of applying
the necessary condition for a state being contained in the support of the long
run distribution introduced by N¨ oldeke and Samuelson (1993) is that one
can conclude immediately that just a single suitable mutations is required
to trigger the long run outcome. That is, given our set of absorbing states,
convergence to the long run outcome is comparatively rather fast. Note how-
24ever, that this condition is not applicable generally and does not allow in
general for conclusions about the speed of convergence. See Ellison (2000)
for a more general method also characterizing the speed of convergence.
The key property driving the result is the observation that the payoﬀ
functions in a Cournot game are submodular in individual and total quantity.
This is closely related to strategic substitutes. It suggests that the same result
does not emerge in games with a diﬀerent order structure such as games with
strategic complements. It also suggests that the same result holds in other
games with strategic substitutes and negative aggregate externalities. E.g.
consider a repeated Nash demand game.15 Suppose now that the imitator
demands a share larger than 50% of the pie. What can an optimizer do?
It can optimize by demanding the highest share compatible to the claim of
the imitator. If the optimizer demands less then it forgoes proﬁts. If the
optimizer demands more then both make zero proﬁts. Assuming that the
imitator mimics itself in such situation we can conclude that the optimizer
can not manipulate the decision of the imitator in its favor. Hence it appears
that also in this repeated Nash demand game the imitator is better oﬀ than
is the optimizer. What is eventually wrong with Friedman’s conjecture is
that he does not consider a class of strategic situations in which “the wise
one gives in” (a translated German proverb: “Der Kl¨ ugere gibt nach.”) The
mechanism is similar to the idea of spiteful behavior in evolutionary biology.
A ﬁrm’s action can be called spiteful if it forgoes proﬁts in order to lower
the proﬁts of its competitors even further (see for example Schaﬀer, 1989).
In our context, we face the “dual” to spite. The optimizers, while increasing
their absolute proﬁts, do not care about increasing the proﬁts of the imitators
even further.
15I thank Ariel Rubinstein for motivating this example.
25Since both, imitation behavior as well as best response, is supported
by experimental ﬁndings in Cournot markets depending on the amount of
information provided to subjects (see Sauermann and Selten, 1959, Huck,
Normann, and Oechssler, 1999, 2000, Oﬀerman, Potters, and Sonnemans,
2002), it is only natural to test whether my results can be supported experi-
mentally if diﬀerent amounts of information are given to various ﬁrms in an
oligopoly experiment. This shall be left to further research.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1.
To show this Lemma for all (q,Q) ∈ Γ × {0,δ,2δ,...,nνδ}, one has to show the
following inequality
π((q0,Q0) ∧ (q00,Q00)) + π((q0,Q0) ∨ (q00,Q00)) ≤ π(q0,Q0) + π(q00,Q00) (14)
for the cases (i) q0 ≥ q00 and Q0 ≥ Q00, (ii) q0 < q00 and Q0 ≥ Q00, (iii) q0 ≥ q00 and
Q0 < Q00 as well as (iv) q0 < q00 and Q0 < Q00. In particular, strict submodularity
requires to show a strict inequality for the cases (ii) and (iii) since neither (q0,Q0) ≥
(q00,Q00) nor (q00,Q00) ≥ (q0,Q0).
Case (i) and (iv):
π((q0,Q0) ∧ (q00,Q00)) + π((q0,Q0) ∨ (q00,Q00)) = π(q0,Q0) + π(q00,Q00).
Case (iii): Since by Assumption 1, p is strictly decreasing
p(Q00) < p(Q0)
p(Q00)(q0 − q00) < p(Q0)(q0 − q00)
p(Q00)(q0 − q00) − c(q0) + c(q00) < p(Q0)(q0 − q00) − c(q0) + c(q00)
π(q0,Q00) − π(q00,Q00) < π(q0,Q0) − π(q00,Q0)
26π(q00,Q0) + π(q0,Q00) < π(q0,Q0) + π(q00,Q00)
π((q0,Q0) ∧ (q00,Q00)) + π((q0,Q0) ∨ (q00,Q00)) < π(q0,Q0) + π(q00,Q00).
Case (ii): By Assumption 1, p is strictly decreasing. Thus we have analogous to
previous steps
p(Q00) > p(Q0)
p(Q00)(q0 − q00) < p(Q0)(q0 − q00)
π((q0,Q0) ∧ (q00,Q00)) + π((q0,Q0) ∨ (q00,Q00)) < π(q0,Q0) + π(q00,Q00).
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of the Theorem 1 follows from below lemmata.
Recall that Z is the collection of all absorbing sets of the unperturbed decision
dynamics when ε = 0.
Lemma 2 (Absorbing Sets) If Assumptions 2, 4, 5 and 6 hold, then Z = H
with Z = {{ω} : ω ∈ H}.
Proof. First, suppose that some state ω / ∈ H, ω ∈ Γn is an element of an
absorbing set A. At least one condition of (i) to (iv) of Deﬁnition 5 is violated.
Thus there will be an incentive for some imitators or some optimizers to deviate
from their output in ω. By Assumptions 2 and 6 we can construct an unperturbed
adjustment process based on the decision rules leading in the subsequent periods
to a state ω0 ∈ H, noting that by Assumptions 4 and 5 such ω0 ∈ H exists and is
uniquely deﬁned.
Second, we show that every absorbing set A ⊆ H is a singleton. Suppose
∃ω0,ω ∈ A ⊆ H such that ω0 6= ω. Note that by Assumptions 4 and 5 at least
two Pseudo-Stackelberg states exist and are uniquely deﬁned. By the deﬁnition
of absorbing set, ∃m ∈ N, m ﬁnite s.t. p
(m)
ωω0 > 0. Consider any imitator i ∈ I.
27Since in ω ∈ H it follows by Deﬁnition 5 (i), (iii), and (iv) as well as DI that
no imitator i ∈ I wants to deviate form its output in ω ∈ H. Now consider an
optimizer i ∈ N \ I. Since ω ∈ H, it follows by aforesaid Deﬁnition 5 (ii) that no
optimizer i ∈ N \ I wants to deviate from its best reply in ω ∈ H, which is by
Assumption 5 uniquely deﬁned. Since both types of ﬁrms do not deviate in ω ∈ H,
no ﬁrm i ∈ N deviates in any of the following periods. Thus p
(m)
ωω0 = 0,∀m ∈ N,
which contradicts that ω0,ω ∈ A, ω0 6= ω. It follows that pωω = 1 for each ω ∈ H
such that {ω} = A, ∀ω ∈ H. From the ﬁrst part of the proof we can conclude that
6 ∃ω / ∈ H s.t. ω ∈ A, A ∈ Z. Hence Z = {{ω} : ω ∈ H}. This completes the proof
of Lemma 2. q.e.d.
In order to characterize the support of the unique limiting invariant distribution
further, we consider perturbations introduced by Assumption 3. We show that the
Cournot Nash equilibrium is not the unique stochastically stable state.
We call states ω and ω0 adjacent if exactly one mutation can change the state
from ω to ω0 (and vice versa), i.e. if exactly one ﬁrm’s change of output changes
the state ω to the state ω0. The set of all states adjacent to state ω is the single
mutation neighborhood of ω denoted by M(ω). The basin of attraction of an
absorbing set A is the set B(A) = {ω ∈ Γn|∃m ∈ N,∃ω0 ∈ A s.t. p
(m)
ωω0 > 0}.
It is the collection of all states from which there is a strict positive probability
that the (unperturbed) dynamics leads to the absorbing set A. A recurrent set
R is a minimal collection of absorbing sets with the property that there do not
exist absorbing sets A ∈ R and A0 / ∈ R such that ∀ω ∈ A, M(ω) ∩ B(A0) 6= ∅.
That is, a recurrent set R is a minimal collection of absorbing sets for which it is
impossible that a single mutation followed by the unperturbed dynamics leads to
an absorbing set not contained in R. The importance of the recurrent set stems
from below Lemma 3 by N¨ oldeke and Samuelson (1993), Samuelson (1994) and
N¨ oldeke and Samuelson (1997).
Lemma 3 (N¨ oldeke and Samuelson) Given a regularly perturbed ﬁnite Markov
28chain, then at least one recurrent set exists. Recurrent sets are disjoint. Let the
state ω be contained in the support of the unique limiting invariant distribution
ϕ∗. Then ω ∈ R, R being a recurrent set. Moreover, ∀ω0 ∈ R, ϕ∗(ω0) > 0.
A proof of Lemma 3 is contained in Samuelson (1997), Lemma 7.1 and Propo-
sition 7.7., proof pp. 236-238.
Deﬁnition 6 Deﬁne ¯ ω ∈ H to be the Pseudo-Stackelberg state with the largest
possible identical output of imitators, that is
¯ qp(θn¯ q + (1 − θ)nqD) − c(¯ q) >
qDp(θn¯ q + (1 − θ)nqD) − c(qD), (15)
with qD = b(θn¯ q + ((1 − θ)n − 1)qD),
(¯ q + δ)p(θn(¯ q + δ) + (1 − θ)nqDδ) − c(¯ q + δ) ≤
qDδp(θn(¯ q + δ) + (1 − θ)nqDδ) − c(qDδ), (16)
with qDδ = b(θn(¯ q + δ) + ((1 − θ)n − 1)qDδ).
It is easy to see that ¯ ω is indeed in H, since by deﬁnition all imitators set identical
output ¯ q, all optimizer play best response qD (which is unique by Assumption 5),
and imitators make strictly higher proﬁts than optimizers. That is, all conditions
of Deﬁnition 5 are satisﬁed. ¯ q is indeed the largest identical output that each
imitator can set within the set of Pseudo-Stackelberg states since an increase by δ
yields a state not in H.
Remark 3 Given Assumptions 4 and 5, the Cournot Nash equilibrium ω◦ ∈ H
is the state with the lowest identical output of imitators in the set of Pseudo-
Stackelberg states H.
We call a sequence of Pseudo-Stackelberg states ω1,...,ωm ∈ H increasing
(decreasing) iﬀ the identical output of each imitator in those Pseudo-Stackelberg




ωj+1), j = 1,...,m − 1.
29Lemma 4 Under above assumptions we conclude:
(i) If ωS / ∈ H then there exists an increasing sequence ω1,...,ωm ∈ H with
ω1 = ω◦ and ωm = ¯ ω s.t. M(ωj) ∩ B({ωj+1}) 6= ∅, j = 1,...,m − 1.
(ii) If ωS ∈ H then there exists an increasing sequence ω1,...,ωm ∈ H with
ω1 = ω◦ and ωm = ωS s.t. M(ωj) ∩ B({ωj+1}) 6= ∅, j = 1,...,m − 1.
(iii) If ωS ∈ H then there exists a decreasing sequence ω1,...,ωm ∈ H with ω1 = ¯ ω
and ωm = ωS s.t. M(ωj) ∩ B({ωj+1}) 6= ∅, j = 1,...,m − 1.
Proof. By Lemma 2 we know that each absorbing set is a singleton in H. More-
over, we can enumerate the absorbing sets since Γ is a ﬁnite output grid.
(i): ωS / ∈ H then qS > ¯ q. Deﬁne a sequence of absorbing states ω1,...,ωm ∈
H ⊂ Γn such that ω1 = ω◦, ω2 s.t. qI
ω2 = q◦ + δ, ω3 s.t. qI
ω3 = q◦ + 2δ, ..., ωm−1
s.t. qI
ωm−1 = ¯ q − δ and ωm = ¯ ω. Clearly, this sequence is increasing. In order to
show that M(ωj)∩B({ωj+1}) 6= ∅ for j = 1,...,m−1, we have to show for k = 1,
∀q ∈ [q◦, ¯ q) ⊂ Γ,
(q + δ)p((θn − k)q + k(q + δ) + (1 − θ)nqD) − c(q + δ) >
qp((θn − k)q + k(q + δ) + (1 − θ)nqD) − c(q), (17)
with qD = b((θn−k)q +k(q +δ)+((1−θ)n−1)qD), which is uniquely deﬁned by
Assumption 5.
By Assumption 1, Lemma 1 and Remark 1, π is strictly quasi-submodular
(formulas (3) and (4)). Deﬁne q0 = q + δ, q00 = q, Q0 = (θn − k)q + k(q +
δ) + (1 − θ)nqD0
and Q00 = θn(q + δ) + (1 − θ)nqD00
, with qD0
= b(θn − k)q +
k(q + δ) + ((1 − θ)n − 1)qD0
) and qD00
= b(θn(q + δ) + ((1 − θ)n − 1)qD00
) being
uniquely deﬁned by Assumption 5. Then the right hand side of “=⇒” in the
upper formula (3) is equivalent to inequality (17) if qS ≥ ¯ q, i.e. it is equivalent to
π(q0,Q0) > π((q0,Q0) ∧ (q00,Q000)).
What is left to show is that the left hand side of “=⇒” in the upper formula (3)
is implied by the Assumption 7 of quasiconcavity. To see this note that for each
30q ∈ [q◦, ¯ q] ⊂ Γ there exists a λ ∈ [0,1] s.t. q + δ = λq + (1 − λ)¯ q. Since qS ≥ ¯ q, we
have min{π(q,Q),π(¯ q,Q)} = π(q,Q), ∀q ∈ [q◦, ¯ q], ∀Q ∈ {0,δ,2δ,...,nνδ}. Hence
π(q + δ,Q00) ≥ π(q,Q00), ∀q ∈ [q◦, ¯ q], which is equivalent to the left hand side of
“=⇒” in the upper formula (3), i.e. it is equivalent to π((q0,Q0) ∨ (q00,Q00)) ≥
π(q00,Q00). Thus we have shown that if qS ≥ ¯ q there exists an increasing sequence
of absorbing states through which we can move from the absorbing state with the
lowest output of imitators ω◦ to the absorbing state with the highest output of
imitators ¯ ω by a sequence of single suitable mutations.
(ii) and (iii): If ωS ∈ H then qS ≤ ¯ q. Partition [q◦, ¯ q] ⊂ Γ into {[q◦,qS),qS,(qS, ¯ q]}.
For any q ∈ [q◦,qS) we can show inequality (17) analogous to previous case (i).
The same holds if qS = ¯ q. Hence (ii) is shown.
To show (iii) consider the interval (qS, ¯ q]. Deﬁne a sequence of absorbing states
ω1,...,ωm ∈ H ⊂ Γn such that ω1 = ¯ ω, ω2 s.t. qI
ω2 = ¯ q−δ, ω3 s.t. qI
ω3 = ¯ q−2δ, ...,
ωm−1 s.t. qI
ωm−1 = qS + δ and ωm = ωS. Clearly, this sequence is decreasing. In
order to show that M(ωj) ∩ B({ωj+1}) 6= ∅ for j = 1,...,m − 1, we have to show
for k = 1, ∀q ∈ (qS, ¯ q] ⊂ Γ,
(q − δ)p((θn − k)q + k(q − δ) + (1 − θ)nqD) − c(q − δ) >
qp((θn − k)q + k(q − δ) + (1 − θ)nqD) − c(q), (18)
with qD = b((θn−k)q +k(q −δ)+((1−θ)n−1)qD), which is uniquely deﬁned by
Assumption 5.
By Assumption 1, Lemma 1 and Remark 1, π is strictly quasi-submodular
(formulas (3) and (4)). Deﬁne q0 = q −δ, q00 = q, Q0 = (θn−k)q +k(q −δ)+(1−
θ)nqD0






) being uniquely deﬁned by
Assumption 5. Since qS < ¯ q, the right hand side of “=⇒” in the lower formula (4)
is equivalent to inequality (18).
What is left to show is that the left hand side of “=⇒” in the lower formula (4)
is implied by the Assumption 7 of quasiconcavity. To see this note that for each
31q ∈ [qS, ¯ q] ⊂ Γ there exists a λ ∈ [0,1] s.t. q−δ = λq+(1−λ)qS. Since qS < ¯ q, we
have min{π(q,Q),π(qS,Q)} = π(q,Q), ∀q ∈ [qS, ¯ q], ∀Q ∈ {0,δ,2δ,...,nνδ}. Hence
π(q − δ,Q00) ≥ π(q,Q00), ∀q ∈ [qS, ¯ q], which is equivalent to the left hand side of
“=⇒” in the lower formula (4). This completes the proof of Lemma 4. q.e.d.
Corollary 1 From previous Lemma 4 follows that S 6= {ω◦}.
Proof. By Lemma 4 we know that ∃ω ∈ H, ω 6= ω◦ s.t. M(ω◦) ∩ B({ω}) 6= ∅.
Hence by the deﬁnition of a recurrent set we have R 6= {ω◦}. Thus by Lemma 3
we can conclude that S 6= {ω◦}. q.e.d.
This completes the proof of the Theorem 1.
A.3 Remark 2
Suppose that Assumptions 1 to 6 hold. We have to show that if ωS ∈ H then
M(ω) ∩ B({ωS}) 6= ∅, ∀ω ∈ H \ {ωS}.
Assume ωS ∈ H. It is suﬃcient to show that ∀q ∈ Γ, q being a component of
an arbitrary ω ∈ H, ω 6= ωS, k ∈ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ θn,
qSp((θn − k)q + kqS + (1 − θ)nqD) − c(qS) >
qp((θn − k)q + kqS + (1 − θ)nqD) − c(q), (19)
with qD = b((θn − k)q + kqS + ((1 − θ)n − 1)qD).
By Assumption 1, Lemma 1 and Remark 1, π is strictly quasi-submodular
(formulas (3) and (4)) in (q,Q) on Γ × {0,δ,2δ,...,nνδ}. Deﬁne q0 := qS, q00 := q,
Q0 := (θn − k)q + kqS + (1 − θ)nqD0
and Q00 := θnqS + (1 − θ)nqD00
with qD0
=
b((θn − k)q + kqS + ((1 − θ)n − 1)qD0
) and qD00
= b(θnqS + ((1 − θ)n − 1)qD00
)
being uniquely deﬁned by Assumption 5. If q0 > q00 then θnq0 > (θn − k)q00 + kq0.
By Assumption 5, we get qD00
≥ qD0
. We conclude that Q00 > Q0. If q0 < q00 then
θnq0 < (θn − k)q00 + kq0. By Assumption 5, we get qD00
≤ qD0
and conclude that
32Q00 < Q0. It follows that if q < qS the left hand side of “=⇒” in formula (3) is
given by inequality (10) of Deﬁnition 5 of the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution (i). In
this case the right hand side of “=⇒” in formula (3) yields above inequality (19).
If q > qS the left hand side of “=⇒” in formula (4) is given by inequality (10)
of Deﬁnition 5 of the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution (i). In this case the right hand
side of “=⇒” in formula (4) yields above inequality (19). Finally, set k = 1 to see
that one suitable mutation only is required to connect every ω ∈ H to ωS ∈ H.
This completes the proof of Remark 2.16
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of the Theorem 2 follows from below lemmata.
Lemma 5 There exist p, c, θ, δ and ﬁnite n such that
q◦p((2n − 3)q◦) − c(q◦) ≤ 0, (20)
(n − 1)q◦p((n − 1)q◦) − c((n − 1)q◦) ≤ 0, (21)
q• ≡ ¯ q, (22)
with q• ∈ Γ being the monopoly output.17
Proof. Consider the example p(Q) = 10 − Q, c(qi) = q2
i , θ = 0.6, δ = 0.2, and
n = 5. It is straight forward to verify that formulas (20) to (22) hold. q.e.d.
16An analog proof to the one of Remark 2 can be used to prove a result of Vega-Redondo
(1997) for θ = 1. Just erase any output by optimizers, replace qS by the competitive out-
put, and plug in the formula of quasi-submodularity the deﬁnition of competitive solution
instead the imitator’s Pseudo-Stackelberg solution. Then one can conclude that the com-
petitive solution can be reached by a single suitable mutation in a homogeneous population
of imitators from any other monomorphic absorbing state. It is the submodularity of the
Cournot game, which makes Vega-Redondo’s (1997) result work.
17To avoid stating an additional deﬁnition note that the monopoly-output is a special
case of the Cournot Nash equilibrium in Deﬁnition 3 for n = 1.
33We show that the properties of Lemma 5 together with the above assumptions
are suﬃcient to show that we can connect any Pseudo-Stackelberg state to the
Cournot Nash equilibrium by a single suitable mutation followed by the unper-
turbed decision dynamics.
Lemma 6 Suppose that Assumptions 2 to 6 hold. Moreover, let p, c, θ, δ and n
such that the properties of Lemma 5 hold. Then M(ω) ∩ B({ω◦}) 6= ∅, ∀ω ∈ H.
Proof. Suppose in t any arbitrary state ω(t) ∈ H. By Assumptions 4 and 5 such
state exists and is uniquely deﬁned. W.l.o.g. suppose by Assumptions 2 and 3
that in t + 1 a mutation by one ﬁrm i ∈ N occurs such that qi(t + 1) = (n − 1)q◦.
Note that by Assumption 4 and 5 the Cournot Nash equilibrium output q◦ ∈ Γ
exists and is unique. Since ω(t) ∈ H, we have Q(t + 1) ≥ (n − 1)q◦ + (n − 1)q◦ =
(2n − 2)q◦ > (2n − 3)q◦. By Lemma 5, inequality (20), πj(t + 1) < 0, ∀j ∈ N.
W.l.o.g. assume that by Assumption 2 a ﬁrm k ∈ N\I, k 6= i and only a ﬁrm k has
the opportunity to adjust output in t+2. Since DO(t+1) = 0, we have qk(t+2) = 0.
Q(t + 2) ≥ (2n − 3)q◦. By Lemma 5, inequality (20), πj(t + 1) < 0, ∀j ∈ N\{k}.
W.l.o.g. assume that by Assumption 2 and DO(t+2) = DI(t+2) = 0 all j ∈ N\{i}
adjust output in t+3 such that Q(t+3) = qi(t+3) = qi(t+2) = qi(t+1) = (n−1)q◦.
By Lemma 5, inequality (21), πi(t+3) ≤ 0. W.l.o.g. assume that by Assumption 2,
5 and DO(t + 3) = b((n − 1)q◦) = q◦ another ﬁrm k ∈ N\I has the opportunity
to adjust output in t + 4. Since πk(t + 4) > πj(t + 4), j ∈ N\{k} we can assume
w.l.o.g. that by Assumption 2 and DI(t + 4) = q◦ all j ∈ I adjust output. By
Assumptions 2 and 6 let all remaining optimizers adjust output in the subsequent
periods such that with positive probability ω◦ is reached in ﬁnite time. Since we
started in any arbitrary absorbing state ω(t) ∈ H (in particular it also includes
ωS if ωS ∈ H) we have shown that M(A) ∩ B({ω◦}) 6= ∅, ∀A ∈ Z. q.e.d.
We show that the properties of Lemma 5 together with the above assumptions
are also suﬃcient to show that we can connect any Pseudo-Stackelberg state to
34the Pseudo-Stackelberg solution with the largest output of imitators by a single
suitable mutation followed by the unperturbed decision dynamics.
Lemma 7 Suppose that Assumptions 2 to 6 hold. Moreover, let p, c, θ, δ and n
such that the properties of Lemma 5 hold. Then M(ω) ∩ B({¯ ω}) 6= ∅, ∀ω ∈ H.
Proof. By Assumption 4 and 5, ¯ q exists and is uniquely deﬁned. Suppose in t
any arbitrary state ω(t) ∈ H, which by Assumption 4 exists. W.l.o.g. assume that
by Assumptions 2 and 3 in t + 1 a mutation by an imitator i ∈ I occurs setting a
large ˆ qi such that
qp(Q − qi + ˆ q) − c(q) < 0,∀q > 0. (23)
That is, πj(t+1) < 0, ∀j ∈ N. W.l.o.g. assume that by Assumption 2 all optimizers
in N\I have the opportunity to adjust output in t+2. Since DO(t+1) = 0, we have
qD(t+2) = 0 with πD(t+2) = 0. By inequality (23), we have πI(t+2) < πD(t+2).
W.l.o.g. assume that by Assumption 2 all imitators in I adjust output in t + 3
to DI(t + 2) = qI(t + 3) = 0. Hence, Q(t + 3) = 0. W.l.o.g. assume now that
by Assumption 2 in t + 4 an optimizer k and only an optimizer k ∈ N \ I adjusts
output such that DO(t + 3) = b(0) = q•(t + 4), which by Assumptions 4 and 5
exists and is uniquely deﬁned. W.l.o.g. assume that by Assumptions 2 in t+5 all
imitators in I adjusts output such that DI(t + 4) = q•(t + 5). Let all optimizers
in N\I adjust output in the subsequent periods such that by Assumptions 2, 4,




n ) is reached in ﬁnite time. Since by
Lemma 5, ¯ q = q•, we can conclude that ω• = ¯ ω. q.e.d.
In Lemma 4 we showed already that we can connect the Pseudo-Stackelberg
states by a increasing or decreasing sequence of single suitable mutations followed
by the decision dynamics starting in the Cournot Nash equilibrium or the Pseudo-
Stackelberg state with the largest identical output of imitators. In Lemma 6 and 7
we showed that we can connect by single suitable mutations followed by the deci-
sion dynamics any Pseudo-Stackelberg state to the Cournot Nash equilibrium and
35the Pseudo-Stackelberg state with the largest output of imitators if the properties
of Lemma 5 hold. Hence there exists a sequence of single suitable mutations by
which we can move through the entire set of Pseudo-Stackelberg states. It follows
that H is the unique recurrent set. By Lemma 3 it follows that S = H. This
completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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